Archive for November 2, 2011

IRS Issues Proposal for Determining When a Foreign Government’s Investment Income is Exempt from U.S. Taxation

On November 2, 2011, the IRS proposed to supplement the June 1988 temporary regulations on guidance concerning the taxation of income of foreign and international organizations investing in the United States.  The proposal was in response to
several comments on the 1988 rule.

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According to section 892, a foreign government that derives income from both qualified investments and from commercial activity is eligible to claim tax exemption for only the income from qualified investments, but not the income from commercial activity.

The new proposal addresses government controlled entities (“GCE”) who are U.S. taxed for both its investment income and qualified investments income if they engaged in any commercial activities.  The proposal provides a safe harbor, under certain conditions, for inadvertent commercial activities to not trigger taxation on GCE’s income from qualified investments.

The IRS also proposed, for both foreign governments and GCEs, income from investments in derivatives will be included with those investments that are not considered commercial activities.  The current rule lists investments in physical stocks and securities as non-commercial activities.  The IRS maintained the section 892 requirement that only income from investments in financial instruments held in the execution of governmental financial or monetary policy are tax exempt.

In addition, the IRS responded to comments requesting clarification as to whether an entity that disposes of a United States real property interest (USRPI), as defined in section 897, will be deemed to be engaged in commercial activities solely by reason of this disposition.  The new proposal stated that a section 897 disposition is not a commercial activity.  However, this disposition type would not be tax exempt.

Finally, the proposal modifies the general rule that income from commercial activities of partnerships are attributable to its general and limited partners.  Section 892 provides an exception to income from commercial activities for publicly traded partnerships (“PTPs”).  The proposal amended the PTP exception to include an entity who is not engaged in commercial activities will not be treated as engaged in commercial activities solely because it holds limited partnership interest in a limited partnership who has income from commercial activities.  Similar to the above noted exceptions for commercial activities, the limited partner’s distributive share of partnership income attributable to commercial activities will not be tax exempt.

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CFA Institute: An Examination of Transparency in European Bond Markets

This brief made policy proposals to the European Union that are consistent with the recent proposals to the Markets in Financial Directive (“MiFID) to extend pre-trade and post trade transparency requirements to bond markets.

The European Commission in November 2007, issued the MiFID which “governs the provision of investment services in financial instruments (such as brokerage, advice, dealing, portfolio management, underwriting, etc.) by banks and investment firms and the operation of traditional stock exchanges and alternative trading venues ( so-called
multilateral trading facilities.”  While MiFID created competition between these services and brought more choices and lower prices for investors, shortcomings were exposed in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis.

In October 2011, the European Commission proposed amendments to MiFID to regulate Organized Trading Facilities.  These are markets where standardized derivatives contracts are traded.  It also proposed a new trade transparency regime for non-equities markets (i.e. bonds and structured finance products).

The CFA noted that only Italy has extended pre-trade and post-trade transparency requirements to bonds.  And the United States TRACE system has proved effective in decreasing the arbitrage situations that are caused when bond buyers and sellers meet away from an exchange.  Investors in the European bond markets will benefit from enhanced transparency and decreases in trading costs, because the information advantages are eliminated as bond dealers will compete on prices, not assigned arbitrary indicative prices.

The CFA made the following recommendations to the European Union:

  • The information reported and the timeliness of the information should be based on the size of the trade relative to the size of the issue, and the level of recent trading in that issue.
  • Phase-in new requirements to help mitigate the risk of temporary negative impact on liquidity.
  • Investors should have access to post-trade data on reasonable commercial terms through approved publications.
  • Adopt a “wait and see” approach on pre-trade transparency because a single pre-trade requirement for OTC would be impractical.
  • Include the existing electronic trading platforms in implementing pre-trade transparency requirements for on-exchange transactions.

They noted that the European bond market has more than 150,000 debt securities, as
compared to 6,000 equity shares trading on regulated markets.  And it is common for a company’s debt structure to include several layers of debt issues.

The European Commission’s proposals are to be reviewed by the European Parliament
and the Council (Member States) for negotiation and adoption. Once adopted the
Regulation, the Directive, and the necessary technical rules implementing these will apply together as of the same date.

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SEC Issues New Form PF for Advisers to Private Funds with $150 Million Regulatory Assets Under Management (“RAUM”)

On October 31, 2011, the SEC adopted Investment Advisers Act rule 204(b)-1 and Form PF for qualified investment advisers. The rule is effective March 31, 2012 for required information to be filed on Form PF. This information is for the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”) in its assessment of systemic risk in the U.S. financial system, as required by Title IV of the Dodd Frank Act.
The compliance dates for the rule will be made in two-phases: Phase 1: (i) an adviser managing hedge funds with at least $5 billion in RAUM as of the last day of the quarter most recently completed prior to June 15, 2012.  For example, an adviser reports on a calendar quarter and its RAUM is $5 billion as of March 31, 2012.  It must file Form PF within 60 days following June 30, 2012. (ii) an adviser managing liquidity funds and registered money market funds of at least $5 billion RAUM as of the last day of the fiscal quarter most recently completed prior to June 15, 2012. The Form PF is due within 15 days after June 30, 2012. (iii) an adviser managing private equity funds with at least $5 billion in RAUM as of the last day of its fiscal year end on or after June 15, 2012, must file its first Form PF within 120 days following June 30, 2012, if its fiscal year ends on June 30, 2012.
Phase 2: For all other advisers the compliance date is December 31, 2012.

The filing and updating requirements for qualified advisers are listed in the table below:

Large (RAUM = $1.5 billion) hedge fund advisers Within 60 calendar days after the end of your first, second and third fiscal quarters, you must file a quarterly update that updates the answers to all Items in this Form PF relating to the hedge funds that you advise.  Within 60 calendar days after the end of your fourth fiscal quarter, you must file a quarterly update that updates the answers to all Items in this Form PF.  You may, however, submit an initial filing for the fourth quarter that updates information relating only to the hedge funds that you advise so long as you amend your Form PF within 120 calendar days after the end of the quarter to update information relating to any other private funds that you
advise. When you file such an amendment, you are not required to update information previously filed for such quarter.  Within 15 calendar days after the end of your first, second and third fiscal quarters, you must file a quarterly update that updates the
answers to all Items in this Form PF relating to the liquidity funds that you advise.  Within 15 calendar days after the end of your fourth fiscal quarter, you must file a quarterly update that updates the answers to all Items in this Form PF.  You may, however, submit an initial filing for the fourth quarter that updates information relating only to the liquidity funds that you advise so long as you amend your Form PF within 120 calendar days after the end of the quarter to update information relating to any other private funds that you advise (subject to the next paragraph).  When you file such an amendment, you are not required to update information previously filed for such quarter.
If you are both a large liquidity
fund adviser a
nd a large hedge fund
adviser
You must file your quarterly updates with respect to the liquidity funds that you advise within 15 calendar days and with respect to the hedge funds you advise within 60 calendar days.  Large hedge fund advisers and large
liquidity fund advisers
are not required to file annual updates but instead file quarterly updates for the fourth quarter.
Large (RAUM = $1 billion) liquidity fund advisers You must file your Form PF quarterly with respect to the liquidity funds that you advise within 15 calendar days after quarter end.
Large(RAUM = $2 billion) private fund advisers File Form PF within 120 calendar days after the end of the fiscal year for information relating to private funds that you advise.
All other qualified hedge fund, liquidity or private fund advisers File Form PF within 120 calendar days after the end of the fiscal year for information relating to funds that you advise.

The amount of information collected by the FSOC on Form PF varies based on both the size of the adviser and the types of funds managed.  For example, the Form requires
more information from advisers managing a large amount of hedge funds or
liquidity fund assets than from advisers managing less assets or private equity
funds.  Advisers must file Form PF if they are (i) registered with the SEC; (ii) had a least $150 million in regulatory assets under management attributable to private funds; (iii) advises one or more private funds.  The Form will be filed thru FINRA as an extension of the current IARD System.

Definitions:

Form PF defines “private equity fund” as any private fund that is not a hedge fund, liquidity fund, real estate fund, securitized asset fund or venture capital fund and does not provide investors with redemption rights in the ordinary course.  Form PF defines “hedge fund” generally to include any private fund having any one of three common characteristics of a hedge fund: (a) a performance fee that takes into account market value (instead of only realized gains); (b) high leverage; or (c) short selling.  Solely for purposes of Form PF, a commodity pool that is reported or required to be reported on Form PF is treated as a hedge fund.

For purposes of Form PF, a “liquidity fund” is any private fund that seeks to generate income by investing in a portfolio of short term obligations in order to maintain a stable net asset value per unit or minimize principal volatility for investors.

The instructions address several questions about master feeder funds, parallel managed funds and related managed funds.  They also show the calculations of the thresholds for funds qualifying to report on the Form, and aggreation of the funds reporting in the different sections of the Form.

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Financial Stability Board – Report on Global Adherence to Standards on International Information Exchange

On November 2, 2011 the Financial Stability Board (“FSB”) reported on how global member and nonmember organizations performed on their objectives for information exchange; and cooperation standards in the areas of banking supervision, insurance supervision, and securities regulation.  Our report is mainly on the securities regulation initiative. The United States members of the FSB are:  the SEC; the Department of Treasury, and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

In March 2010, the  FSB was directed by the G20 Leaders to develop a “toolbox of measures” to promote adherence to common standards and international information exchange cooperation.  The G20 was established in 1999, in the wake of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, to bring together major advanced and emerging economies to stabilize the global financial market.  Since its inception, the G20 has held annual Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors’ Meetings and discussed measures to promote the financial stability of the world and to achieve a sustainable economic growth and development.

The securities regulations principles tested were formulated by the International Organizations of Securities Commission (“IOSCO”).  The FSB tested the following principles; enforcement of securities regulations (Principles 8, 9, 10) and cooperation in regulation (Principles 11, 12, 13):

Principle No. 8:  the regulator should have comprehensive inspection, investigation and surveillance powers.

Principle No. 9:  the regulator should have comprehensive enforcement powers.

Principle No. 10:  the regulatory system should ensure an effective and credible use of inspection, investigation, surveillance and enforcement powers and implementation of an effective compliance program.

Principle No. 11:  regulators should have authority to share both public and non public information with domestic and foreign counterparts.

Principle No. 12:  regulators should establish information sharing mechanisms which ensure how and when they will share both public and non public information with their domestic and foreign counterparts.

Principle No. 13:  regulatory system should allow for assistance to be provided to foreign regulators who need to make inquiries in the discharge of their functions and exercise of their powers.

 

Jurisdictions demonstrating sufficiently strong adherence

The following jurisdictions were assessed in their most recent IMF-World Bank detailed assessment reports as compliant or largely compliant with all, or all except one, of the relevant cooperation and information exchange standards. Therefore, these jurisdictions demonstrate sufficiently strong adherence to those standards. The IMF-World Bank assessments were conducted against the versions of the standards and assessment methodologies in force at the time of the assessments. Consequently, in some cases, older versions of these standards and methodologies were used. These assessments will
be updated by the IMF and World Bank over time.

Table 1

Australia Cyprus Iceland Luxembourg South Africa
Austria Denmark Ireland Malta Spain
Bahrain Finland Isle of Man Mexico Sweden
Belgium France Italy Netherlands Switzerland
Bermuda Germany Japan New Zealand Thailand
Brazil Gibraltar Jersey Norway UAE
British Virgin Islands Guernsey Korea Portugal United Kingdom
Canada Hong Kong SAR Liechtenstein Singapore United States
Cayman Islands

 

* FSB member jurisdictions are indicated in bold.

 

Jurisdictions taking the actions recommended by the FSB and/or making material progress towards demonstrating sufficiently strong adherence

Some of the following jurisdictions are in the process of implementing reforms to
strengthen their adherence. Others have old assessments that indicated weaknesses in international cooperation and information exchange, or have never been assessed, and have requested new assessments by the IMF and World Bank. The FSB is working with several authorities to develop a plan for implementing the actions recommended by the IMF-World Bank team in the latest detailed assessment report.

Table 2

ROSC underway* FSB
evaluation team in
dialogue (and, where indicated, ROSC underway or requested)#
ROSC requested or planned
Argentina not previously assessed Greece (insurance) Bahamas (securities)
Chile (banking,
securities)
Mauritius (banking) Barbados (banking, securities)
China not previously assessed Russia’ (banking, insurance, securities) Colombia (banking, securities)
Czech Republic (banking) Turkey (banking)+ Hungary (banking)
India insurance not previously assessed Malaysia not previously assessed

Indonesia not previously assessed

Israel
(banking, insurance)

Poland
(banking, insurance)

Saudi Arabia insurance not previously assessed

Areas of weakness identified in previous IMF-World Bank assessments are
indicated in parentheses. Banking = BCBS Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (principles 3, 21, 24, and/or 25 of the 2006 version); insurance = IAIS Insurance Core Principles (principles 5, 6, 7 and/or 17 of the 2003 version); securities = 1OSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation (principles 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and/or 13 of the 1998 version).

* FSB member jurisdictions are indicated in bold. # indicates those jurisdictions where IMF-World Bank Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (“ROSC”) have been recently completed and for which a copy of the detailed assessment reports is not yet available to the FSB. + indicates those jurisdictions where ROSC is underway or requested.

 

Non-cooperative jurisdictions

The FSB has determined the following jurisdictions to be non-cooperative. Jurisdictions are identified as non-cooperative if they are participating in the FSB’s evaluation process but showing insufficient progress to address weak compliance; not cooperating satisfactorily with the FSB’s process for strengthening adherence (for example, declining to share with the FSB the latest IMF-World Bank detailed assessment reports on the observance of the relevant standards); or not engaged in dialogue with the FSB. The FSB continues to work with these jurisdictions to encourage their adherence to regulatory and supervisory standards on international cooperation and information exchange.

Table 3

Participating in the evaluation
process but showing insufficient progress to address weak compliance

no jurisdictions at present

Not
cooperating satisfactorily with the FSB’s process for strengthening adherence

no jurisdictions at present

Not engaged in dialogue with the FSB

Libya (former regime) never assessed by IMF-World Bank Venezuela never assessed by IMF-World Bank.  The determination of Libya as a non-cooperative jurisdiction was made on the basis of the failure of the former regime to enter into dialogue. The FSB will seek a dialogue with the new authorities, which could lead the FSB to
re-evaluate Libya and move it to another category.

 

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Dodd-Frank is More Right than Wrong – The Brookings Institution

This excerpt is from an article written by Douglas Elliott.  Mr. Elliott is a fellow in Economic Studies at The Brookings Institution, and a member of the Initiative on Business and Public Policy.  An investment banker for two decades, principally at J.P.Morgan, he was president and principal researcher for the Center On Federal Financial Institutions, a non-partisan think tank.

We should not repeal Dodd-Frank. Although far from perfect, it goes a long way towards fixing many of the problems revealed by the severe financial crisis from which we are still recovering. Whatever the exact causes of the crisis, which are still a matter of argument, it vividly revealed a multitude of flaws in how the financial system had been regulated. Dodd Frank fixes many of those problems and others are being tackled through international agreements like the so-called “Basel III” accord, which substantially increases the safety margins of capital and liquidity that banks must hold. Taken together, the reforms mean that banks will be operating with much greater
margins for error, the massive business of derivatives will be safer and more
transparent, regulators will have considerably clearer knowledge of the risks in the system, securitizations will be saner, and the system as a whole will be safer in many other ways.

We cannot make the perfect the enemy of the good. It is true that Dodd-Frank will not eliminate future financial crises– nothing could completely avoid the problems of recurring financial crises fed by basic human traits like greed and fear. Safety margins also generally have economic costs in the good times, as the price for reducing the frequency and severity of truly devastating financial crises that would wipe out the gains from operating more leanly. Safer cars may not go as fast, because of the weight of good bumpers, solidly constructed bodies, etc. However, they are a lot more likely to get you where you are going. Quantitative analyses by neutral experts, not funded by the industry, virtually always conclude that the benefits of financial reform considerably outweigh the costs.

Again, Dodd-Frank is not perfect. More could be done to reduce the number of different regulatory bodies. The Volcker Rule seems to me to do more harm than good. I worry that the Federal Reserve’s ability to intervene in crises has been cut back too far. The list goes on.  Even so, Dodd-Frank and Basel III probably move us  two-thirds of the way from where we were to where we ought to be, which is a big achievement in the real world (and perhaps an even bigger achievement in Washington.) There is room for improvement, but it is important to start with the understanding that it is considerably more right than wrong.

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